New Jersey Employment Lawyer Blog

New York Employees Can Prove Overtime Claim Even if They Falsely Recorded Working No Overtime

July 12, 2011 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court recently ruled that an employee who follows his supervisor’s instruction to falsely report that he did not work any overtime hours still can pursue an overtime claim. It reversed a decision from the Western District of New York, which had dismissed the claim because it did not believe the employee could prove how many hours of overtime he had worked.

Greg Kuebel was a Retail Specialist for Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc. He filed class action lawsuit against Black & Decker, claiming the company’s overtime pay practices violate the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York Labor Law (NYLL). Specifically, Mr. Kuebel claims Black & Decker violated the law by failing to pay him for the overtime hours he worked but did not record on his timesheet — in other words, his “off-the-clock” overtime hours.

Black & Decker’s official policy required Retail Specialists to accurately record their hours on timesheets that they submit to their managers. There was no official Black & Decker policy which prohibited Retail Specialists from working, recording, or being paid for overtime. However, Black & Decker expected its Retail Specialists to finish their work in a 40-hour work week.

Mr. Kuebel alleges it was impossible to finish all of his work in 40 hours per week, and as a result often worked overtime. However, he did not list any overtime on his timesheets, and therefore was not paid for his overtime hours. Mr. Kuebel explained that he falsified his timesheets because his supervisors instructed him not to record more than 40 hours of work per week because the company could not afford overtime. Mr. Kuebel testified that to the best of his memory he worked more than 40 hours almost every week, and averaged between 1 to 5 hours of overtime per week. After Mr. Kuebel told his supervisor that he had been falsifying his timesheets, Black & Decker fired him for poor performance, dishonesty, and falsification of company records.

In Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., the Court explained that to prove an overtime case under the FLSA, an employee has to prove he was not properly paid for working more than 40 hours in a work week, and his employer either actually knew it or should have known about it under the circumstances. To prove the amount of overtime pay to which he is entitled, an employee needs enough evidence to show the amount and extent of the overtime he worked. However, he does not have to prove the amount of overtime he worked with definiteness, and can prove his overtime hours through an inference. Accordingly, the Court ruled that when a company’s time records are inaccurate or inadequate, the solution is not to penalize the employee by denying him any legal recovery.

To summarize, an employee can win an overtime case if (1) he proves he actually worked overtime and was not properly paid for it, and (2) he has enough evidence to show how much overtime he worked through a reasonable inference. An employee can meet this burden through estimates based on his own recollection. This can be true even when the employee admittedly falsified his own timesheets, at least where the employee’s falsification was based on an instruction from a manager or supervisor. That is because it is the employer’s duty to maintain accurate time records for its employees, and employers cannot delegate that duty to their employee. Once an employer knows or has reason to know an employee is working overtime, it cannot deny compensation simply because the employee failed to properly record or claim his overtime hours.

Supreme Court Rejects Gender Discrimination Class Action Against Wal-Mart

July 1, 2011 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

On June 20, 2011, in a closely watched employment law case, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a group of approximately one-and-a-half-million female employees of Wal-Mart could not bring a class action gender discrimination lawsuit against the company. Specifically, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court found the women’s claims were not similar enough to each other to proceed as a class action. It reached that conclusion because the alleged discriminatory decisions were made by hundreds of different managers throughout the country, and were not based on a uniform corporate policy.

Three women, Betty Dukes, Christine Kwapnoski, and Edith Arana filed the lawsuit. They alleged that Wal-Mart gave its local store managers broad discretion to make salary and promotional decisions, the managers used that discretion to discriminate against women, and the company knew about the discrimination but did nothing to stop it. The women claim this is discrimination on the basis of their sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII is a federal law that prohibits employment discrimination due to gender, race, color, and religion.

Class actions are cases in which one or more individuals bring a case on behalf of a much larger group. To bring a class action, the plaintiffs must prove:

The class is so large that it is impractical for each plaintiff to sue individually;
There are questions of law and fact common to the whole group;
The claims of the plaintiffs who filed the lawsuit (the class representatives) are typical of the claims of the rest of the group; and
The class representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the whole group.

In the Walmart case, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs could not meet the first two requirements because they did not have any evidence that Wal-Mart had a company-wide policy or practice of discriminating against women. The Court found it is not enough to show the company gave broad discretion to its managers, and many or most of those managers abused their discretion by discriminating. Rather, it concluded that since the members of the potential class had been impacted by millions of separate employment decisions made by thousands of different supervisors, it would be impossible to decide all of their claims in a single case. As a result, it ruled that the case cannot proceed as a class action. Instead, it sent it back to the trial court so Ms. Dukes, Ms. Kwapnoski, and Ms. Arana each can try to prove her individual gender discrimination case against Wal-Mart.

New Jersey Employees Can Enforce Employer’s Promise of Reinstatement After Maternity Leave

June 22, 2011 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

In an important employment law decision, on June 8, 2011, New Jersey’s Appellate Division ruled that an employee can enforce her employer’s promise that she would have a job when she returned from her maternity leave. The Court reached that conclusion even though the company, Telcordia Technologies, Inc., included a clear disclaimer in both its Code of Business Ethics and the employee’s job application which stated that she is an employee-at-will who can be fired “at any time, with or without grounds, just cause or reason and without giving prior notice.”

In Lapidoth v. Telcordia Technologies, Inc., employee Sara Lapidoth asked her employer for a six-month maternity leave from her position as a manager on a product called ARIS, for the birth of her tenth child. The letter Telcordia sent her granting her leave also guaranteed that the company would reinstate her to the same job or a comparable one if she returned to work within 12 months. Ms. Lapidoth later asked Telcordia to extend her leave by 6 months, for a total of a one-year maternity leave. Telcordia granted her request through another letter that promised to reinstate her at the end of her leave.

However, before Ms. Lapidoth was ready to return from her maternity leave, Telcordia decided to eliminate one of its two ARIS manager positions. The company decided to lay off Ms. Lapidoth because the only other ARIS manager had slightly better performance ratings. Since the company did not have any appropriate job openings, it fired Ms. Lapidoth.

The Appellate Division ruled that Ms. Lapidoth’s maternity leave was not protected by the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) or the New Jersey Family Leave Act (NJFLA) because she took off more than 12 weeks. Both the FMLA and the NJFLA require employers to give qualified employees up to 12 weeks off for the birth of a child.

However, the Court ruled that the letters Telcordia sent to Ms. Lapidoth could be enforceable employment contracts that guaranteed her a job when she was ready to return from her maternity leave. It found that, even though the company’s Code of Business Ethics and Ms. Lapidoth’s employment application said she was an employee-at-will, and indicated that nothing else could create any contractual rights between her and the company, the letters granting her maternity leave seemed to contradict those statements. The Court also stated that, although the letters said the company did not have to reinstate Ms. Lapidoth if it had to eliminate her job, that was not necessarily a defense because the company decided it had to eliminate one of two ARIS manager positions, but not necessarily Ms. Lapidoth’s position. The Court also noted that Telcordia reinstated Ms. Lapidoth after each of her nine previous maternity leaves. Based on the circumstances, the Appellate Division concluded that a jury could find the letters guaranteeing Ms. Ladipodth a job at the end of her maternity leave created an enforceable employment contract.

New Jersey Employees Can Recover Lost Wages if Forced to Resign Because Retaliation Caused Psychiatric Disorder

June 9, 2011 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Earlier today, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that employees who are forced to resign as a result of retaliation by their employers in violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) may be able to recover lost past and future wages even if they were not fired or constructively discharged. CEPA is New Jersey’s whistleblower law. Among other things, it prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who object to or refuse to participate in activities they reasonably believe are illegal, fraudulent, or violate a clear mandate of public policy regarding public health, safety, welfare, or the environment.

John Seddon, an employee who worked as an operator technician for DuPont, reported numerous workplace safety concerns, and eventually filed a complaint with the United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). DuPont retaliated against him in numerous ways, including verbal abuse, negative performance reviews, putting him on probation, forcing him to take a disability leave, suspending him for 53 days, making false accusations about him, and requiring him to work 12-hour shifts in isolation. The harassment eventually caused Mr. Seddon to suffer a mental breakdown. Unable to work for DuPont any longer, he took a 6-month disability leave of absence, and then began receiving a disability pension.

After a trial, a jury awarded Mr. Seddon $724,000 in economic damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. The trial court also awarded him $523,289 in attorney’s fees, for a total of nearly $1.75 million. However, the New Jersey Appellate Division reversed the verdict, ruling that Mr. Seddon could not recover lost wages under CEPA because he was neither fired nor constructively discharged. A constructive discharge is when an employee is forced to quit because his work environment is so intolerable that any reasonable person in his situation would feel compelled to resign.

But, the New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed that an actual firing or constructive discharge is required for an employee to recover lost wages under CEPA. Rather, the Court ruled that an employee can recover lost wages if his employer’s illegal retaliation caused him to be unable to work. As a result, in Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works, it restored Mr. Seddon’s judgment.

Court Rules Public Employee’s Internet Postings Can Be Protected by the First Amendment

June 8, 2011 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Earlier this year, in an unpublished opinion, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a trial judge should not have dismissed a lawsuit claiming that his employer fired him in retaliation for speaking about a matter of public concern, in violation of First Amendment. The Third Circuit is a federal court that handles appeals from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.

The case, Beyer v. Duncannon Borough, involves Police Officer Eric Beyer’s claim that his employer, the Duncannon Borough, fired him in retaliation for expressing his opinion that the Borough should purchase higher velocity weapons for its police officers. Beyer posted comments on the internet and appeared on the Fox local news to express his opinion about purchasing the weapons. Mr. Beyer’s claims that Borough officials “openly attacked” him in response to his opinion, called his internet postings inappropriate, and eventually fired him.

Beyer sued, claiming the decision to fire him was retaliation in violation of his right to free speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court dismissed his case, finding the facts did not support the conclusion that the Borough retaliated against him.

The Third Circuit disagreed, and reinstated Mr. Beyer’s case. First, it explained that a public employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment if (1) he spoke as a citizen, rather than in his capacity as an employee, about a matter of public concern, and (2) the government did not have an adequate reason for treating him differently. On the first requirement, it found Mr. Beyer could have been speaking in his capacity as a citizen because he made his internet postings and gave his television interview during his off-duty hours, and used a pseudonym for his internet postings rather than making them as part of his job duties as a police officer. With respect to the second requirement, the court found Mr. Beyer’s opinion that the Police Department should have higher velocity weapons could relate to a matter of public concern because it had to do with the safety of the Police Force, which in turn relates to public safety. The Court also considered the fact that Mr. Beyer communicated his opinion publicly, using the internet and TV news.

The Third Circuit then concluded that Mr. Beyer’s alleged facts supported the conclusion that his employer fired him in retaliation for his speech on an issue of public concern. It noted that employee can prove retaliation based on either (1) very close timing between the employee’s legally protected activity and the employer’s act of retaliation, or (2) a pattern of antagonism between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s act of retaliation. It found that, based on Mr. Beyer’s allegations, it was plausible that the Borough had retaliated against him. It therefore ruled that he should have an opportunity to try to prove his claim, and reversed the trial court’s decision dismissing his case.

Filing Lawsuit Can Be Protected Under New Jersey’s Whistleblower Law

June 3, 2011 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

On April 14, 2011, New Jersey’s Appellate Division ruled that filing an employment discrimination lawsuit can be a protected “whistleblower” activity under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA). Among other things, CEPA prohibits New Jersey employers from retaliating against an employee because he discloses or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or a public body, an activity, policy or practice that he reasonably believes violates the law.

The case, Hester v. Parker, involves Terry Hester, the former Director of Facilities/Operations for the Winslow Township Board of Education (Board). Mr. Hester, who is Caucasian, complained to the Board’s Director of Human Resources that Patricia Parker, an African-American Board member, made racist and discriminatory comments about job candidates.

After the Board failed to address his internal discrimination complaint, Mr. Hester filed a lawsuit under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). However, the trial court dismissed his lawsuit.

But, in an unpublished decision the Appellate Division reversed. It ruled that both Mr. Hestor’s internal complaint and lawsuit alleging reverse discrimination could be considered protected “whistleblowing” under CEPA. The Court also concluded that a jury could find the Board’s decision to fire Mr. Hestor was retaliatory based on the fact that it gave him a negative performance evaluation only ten days after he filed his lawsuit, and the Superintendent recommended firing him only nine days after the Board received a copy of his lawsuit.

However, the Appellate Division made it clear that not every civil lawsuit or internal complaint to an employer is covered by CEPA. Rather, it ruled that a lawsuit is protected by CEPA only if (1) the employee complained about a violation of a mandatory legal standard like discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or sexual preference, and (2) the employee made an internal complaint before filing the lawsuit, but the employer failed to address it.

New Jersey Court Rules Employers Cannot Force Employees to Take FMLA Leave

May 27, 2011 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

On May 5, 2011, New Jersey’s Appellate Division ruled that employers do not have the right to force employees to complete Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) medical certifications, or to require employees to take FMLA leaves. The FMLA is a federal law that permits qualified employees to take up to 12 weeks off per year for (1) their own serious health condition, (2) the serious health condition of their spouse, son, daughter, or parent, (3) their own pregnancy, or (4) the adoption, or placement of a child in foster care.

The case, In the Matter of Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, involves an employee who wanted to use paid sick leave instead of taking an unpaid FMLA leave when he took a family leave to care for a sick relative. His employer, the Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, asked him to submit a FMLA certification form from his health care provider, and threatened to suspend him after he refused to submit the form.

The Appellate Division concluded that the FMLA does not permit an employer to force an employee to submit an FMLA medical certification, and therefore it is improper for an employer to discipline an employee because he refuses to submit one. Furthermore, if the employee is entitled to take the same time off under another employment policy or a union collective bargaining agreement, then the employer must grant the employee but the employee will not be protected by the FMLA.

The Appellate Division also ruled that if an employee refuses to provide enough information for the employer to determine whether his leave qualifies under the FMLA, then the company can deny the employee’s request for an FMLA leave on that basis. That is because the employer does not have enough information to determine whether the leave qualifies under the FMLA due to the employee’s refusal to provide enough information. So, for example, if the employer asks the employee to submit an FMLA medical certification, and the employee refuses to do so, then the employer can deny the employee’s request for an FMLA leave.
In reaching those conclusions, the Appellate Division explained that companies covered by the FMLA must give employees four different forms of notice about their rights under the FMLA:

General Notice: Employers must post general notice of the FMLA’s provisions and the procedures for filing a complaint for a violation of the FMLA in a conspicuous location, and include it in any employee handbooks or other written policies provided to employees;
Eligibility Notice: When the employer becomes aware that an employee’s time off might qualify under the FMLA, the employer must tell the employee whether he is eligible to take an FMLA leave based on his length of employment and the size of the company;
Rights and Responsibilities Notice: When an employee requests an FMLA-qualifying leave, or the employer has enough information to know the employee’s leave might qualify under the FMLA, the employer must tell the employee about his rights and responsibilities under the FMLA, and the potential consequence if he fails to meet those obligations; and
Designation Notice: Once an employer has enough information to determine whether an employee’s requested leave qualifies under the FMLA, it must inform him whether it qualifies.

Limited Time to Review Release is No Defense to Waiver of Employment Law Claims

May 10, 2011 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Often, companies offer money or other benefits to employees who they have laid off or fired, as part of a severance agreement or separation package. Most severance agreements require you to waive your employment law rights before you can receive those benefits. In a recent case, Gregory v. Derry Township School District, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that an employee waived her right to bring a discrimination claim against her employer because she signed a Separation Agreement and General Release, even though she only had 15 minutes to review it before she signed it.

The Third Circuit is the federal appellate court that handles appeals from the District of New Jersey. It ruled that when deciding whether an employee had waived his legal rights, a Court should look at the totality of the circumstances including:

How clear and specific the language of the release is;
The employee’s education and business experience;

New Jersey Makes it Illegal to Discriminate Against Unemployed Job Candidates

May 2, 2011 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Last November, I wrote about a potential new law that would make it illegal for companies in New Jersey to say that unemployed job candidates need not apply for job openings. Governor Christopher Christie conditionally vetoed the bill, and recommended several changes to it. The Legislature passed an amended version of the bill, which Governor Christopher Christie signed it into law on March 29, 2011. The new law goes into effect on June 1, 2011.

Under the new unemployment discrimination law, it is illegal for employers to knowingly or purposefully publish or print on the internet a job advertisement that states that (1) being currently employed is a job requirement; (2) the employer will not consider job applicants who are currently unemployed; or (3) the employee will only consider job applicants who are currently employed. However, the law does not apply if it would conflict New Jersey civil service laws. It also does not prevent companies from advertising that only job applicants who are currently working for the employer will be considered.

The new employment law statute also makes it clear that it does not prohibit employers from advertising any other qualifications for a job permitted by law, such as requiring a valid professional or occupational license, certificate, registration, permit or other credential, or a minimum level of education, training, or experience.

The new law makes it clear that it does not give individuals who have been impacted the right to bring a private lawsuit. Instead, employers who violate the law are subject to fines of up to $1,000 for a first violation, and up to $5,000 for any subsequent violations. This is significantly lower than the originally proposed fines of up to $5,000 for a first violation and up to $10,000 for any subsequent violations.

More About the EEOC’s New Americans with Disabilities Act Regulations

April 19, 2011 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Last week, I discussed the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)’s new regulations regarding the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA) which discuss the newly broadened scope of the ADA, and the terms “major life activity” and “substantially limited.” In this article, I will focus on ADAAA regulations that cover the concept of “mitigating measures” for disabilities, and how to prove that an employee has a “record of” a disability or is “regarded as” having a disability.

What Are “Mitigating Measures,” and When Can They Be Taken Into Consideration Under the ADAAA?

Under the ADAAA, most “mitigating measures” must be ignored when determining whether an individual is disabled include. A mitigating measure is something that reduces or minimizes the limitations caused by a disability. Examples of mitigating measures include medication, medical equipment and devices, prosthetic limbs, low vision devices, hearing aids, mobility devices, oxygen therapy equipment, use of assistive technology, reasonable accommodations, learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications, psychotherapy, behavioral therapy, and physical therapy.

However, the new ADAAA regulations indicate it is appropriate to consider the negative side effects of a mitigating measure when determining whether an individual is disabled. Similarly, it is proper to consider a mitigating measure when deciding whether an employee is qualified for his job, or is entitled to a reasonable accommodation for his disability.

What Does it Mean to Have a “Record of” a Disability?

In addition to protecting individuals who are actually disabled, the ADA protects individuals with a “record of” a disability. Under the new ADAAA regulations, someone has a record of a disability if he previously had an impairment that substantially limited him in a major life activity, or was misclassified as having an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.

What Does it Mean to Be “Regarded as” Having a Disability?
The ADAAA also protects individuals who are “regarded as” being disabled. According to the new regulations, this includes any employee whose employer correctly or incorrectly believed he has an impairment, unless the employer reasonably believed the impairment was both minor and expected to last for six months or less. Unlike the previous ADA regulations, under the new regulations an employer does not have to believe the impairment substantially limited the employee’s ability to perform a major life activity to regard an employee as disabled.